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Were the TennCare and TennCare Partners programs 
effective or fruitless in their attempts to transform 
the health care industry into both a more effective and 
more efficient mechanism of delivering health care? 
This paper gives a brief synopsis of the drastically 
changing health care environment of our nation - the 
rapidly escalating costs of health care combined with the 
lack of universal coverage of all citizens. It explains 
the massive switch from traditional fee-for-service plans 
to current capitated managed care techniques by focusing 
on Tennessee's ambitious and innovative attempt to remedy 
this health care dilemma through two programs labeled 
TennCare and TennCare Partners. An overview of both the 
TennCare and TennCare Partners programs are delineated 
along with goals and objectives of each. The three major 
goals of each of the programs - 1) cost containment, 
2)increased access, and 3)quality standards are 
examined and evaluated in detail along with the author's 
conclusions of both of the programs accomplishments and 
inadequacies. 
i 
TennCare - Success or Failure? 
Introduction 
The economics of the entire health care industry 
has changed drastically since its inception long ago, 
but current changes have been rather intense and fairly 
sudden. Wi th the recent annual increases in heal th 
care expenditures, as illustrated in table I, 
widespread implementation of new payment system 
techniques has been necessary. The leading 
transformation of the health care industry has corne in 
the form of managed care and the capitated care 
environment, and thus both a reevaluation as well as a 
restructuring of the industry's practice patterns and 
treatment standards has occurred. This has by no means 
been a simple process for anyone, but the widely 
varying degrees of adversity among plans has been quite 
startling to all. This is especially true for the 
massive state level 
Medicaid growth, as 
Medicaid programs. 
shown in table 2, 
National 
has been 
atrocious since its inception in 1966. These Medicaid 
programs are unique in that they commonly treat the 
uninsured or uninsurable population. This slender 
1 
fraction of the populace are often placed in 
distinctive dilemmas because they are either unaware of 
how to fully utilize the health care system or for some 
further reason are incapable of accessing the system at 
all. 
With so many interwoven variables at play, the 
contrasting measures of achievement among the statewide 
programs should be of no great surprise. However, one 
may dare say that all of the states have been at least 
partially successful in their attempts to both control 
costs and improve access while maintaining at minimum a 
parallel quality status of health care for their 
inhabitants. In the mid 1970 I S not one state had a 
managed care Medicaid program in progress, by 1995 46 
states had switched to this strategy along with nearly 
13.3 million people across the nation (this is the most 
current year in which national data is available, see 
table 3 in appendix) 1 • Total enrollees in health 
maintenance organizations exclusive of the Medicaid 
program have also grown substantially during this 
period from 6 million persons in 1976 to over 75 
million in 1995, and growth has been even greater in 
the mental health and substance abuse market - nearing 
1 Thompson F, Dilulio J. Medicaid and Devolution - A View from 
the States. The Brookings Institution, Washington D.C., 1998. 
2 
50 percent of all Americans or approximately 130 
million people2 • As illustrated by these statistics, 
the growth of managed care across the nation has been 
both rapid and widespread. This document will attempt 
to restrict this seemingly infinite subject by focusing 
on just one state's outcome, Tennessee, and comparing 
its values to other states results and national trends. 
2Shore M. Managed Care, the Private Sector, and Medicaid Mental 
Health and Substance Abuse Services ... 
3 
TennCare Overview 
On January 1, 1994, Tennessee made history by 
beginning a program labeled TennCare, which was one of 
the first statewide health care reforms to replace the 
traditional Medicaid program already in existence. 
TennCare was an innovative and ambitious strategy to 
extend health care coverage for Tennesseans while 
simultaneously controlling costs and maintaining 
significant quality standards of medical care3 • This 
switch from the traditional Medicaid program to the new 
managed care strategy essentially transformed the 
state' s health care industry from a seller's market 
into a buyer's market, and by doing so would hopefully 
achieve the aforementioned goals of cost containment, 
expanded access, and analogous quality standards. 
Under prevailing federal law the program would have 
been unconstitutional because of the forbiddance of the 
managed care concepti 
constitutional under 
Social Security Act 
however, the program was deemed 
a Section 1115 waiver of the 
granted by the Health Care 
Financing Administration (HCFA) of the United States 
government. 
3 Mirvis D, Chang C, Hall C, Zaar G, Applegate W. "TennCare-
Health System Reform for Tennessee." JAMA. 1995:274:1235-1241. 
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One may wonder, ~Why the sudden switch to managed 
care?" There are actually multiple justifications for 
this. As is the case in most governmental action, 
necessity simply became the 'Mother Of Invention' as 
stated by Gordon Bonnyman in the Journal of Health 
Affairs 1996. [Bonnyman is a managing attorney at the 
Tennessee Justice Center in Nashville, and was formerly 
on the staff of the Legal Aid Society of Middle 
Tennessee. He has played an integral role in the 
implementation and surveying of the TennCare program.] 
Years of rapidly escalating costs in the health care 
arena were creating an intense budget crisis that 
threatened the solvency of the entire state government. 
As was the case in most states, Medicaid had become the 
second fastest growing item (Education was first) in 
the Tennessee budget. Compounding this problem was the 
fact that Tennessee faced losing nearly $500 million in 
funding from the federal government due to new federal 
laws trying to curb 'creative financing' techniques of 





(DSH) payments and 
schemes to induce 
disproportionate-share 
other enhanced provider 
hospitals and other 
facilities such as nursing homes to partially fund the 
state's Medicaid costs.] Therefore, it was thought by 
both Tennessee Governor Ned McWherter and his staff 
5 
that the drastic change involved in TennCare was 
necessary for the stabilization of the state's 
budgetary crisis. The sudden implementation period was 
ingeniously used by Governor McWherter to assure the 
initiation of the program at all. 
A rough proposal of the TennCare program was 
quickly passed through a closing legislative session 
with only hazy objectives and simplistically stated 
goals. The proposal was then refined by McWherter and 
his staff before the 1993 session ended on the belief 
that unless the state was 
TennCare's implementation 
reconvened in late January 
decisively committed to 
when the legislature 
for its 1994 session, 
lawmakers would face irresistible pressure to revoke 
their earlier authorization of the program3 • In other 
words, once the simplistic program was hastened through 
the legislature it would be much more difficult for the 
program to be repealed than waiting and trying to pass 
the final product after opposition might (and probably 
would) have arisen a simple political tactic used 
masterfully by the McWherter campaign. To further 
influence the implementation process, Governor 
3Mirvis D, Chang C, Hall C, Zaar G, Applegate W. "TennCare-
Health System Reform for Tennessee." JAMA. 1995:274:1235-1241. 
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McWherter went to Washington to pressure the Clinton 
Administration to approve the waivers necessary to 
begin the plan. Less than two weeks after the Governor 
visited the White House, on November 18, 1993, the 
Health Care Financing Administration sanctioned the 
waivers necessary to execute the plan3 • 
two vital circumstances a budgetary 
Due to these 
crisis and 
crucial timing TennCare was facilitated 
considerably accelerated pace toward a swift 
sparsely debated beginning. 
at a 
and 
As Bonnyman delineates, aside from these above 
mentioned situations, three other favorable market 
conditions existed that enabled TennCare to be as 
successful as it has become. First, the state of 
Tennessee had a substantial excess capacity in the 
health care system. This fact was most significant in 
the hospital sector, where national averages of bed 
occupancy were a mere 47% for licensed beds4 • Since 
much of a hospital's expenses are fixed costs that are 
incurred whether or not a bed is occupied, the marginal 
cost of treating an additional patient in what would 
3Mirvis D, Chang C, Hall C, Zaar G, Applegate W. "TennCare-
Health System Reform for Tennessee." JAMA. 1995: 274: 1235-1241. 
4 Cleverley, The 1994 Almanac of Hospital Indicators, 233, 237. 
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have otherwise been an empty bed is only a small 
fraction of the rate paid by almost any insurance 
company - or in this case the state's old Medicaid 
program now labeled TennCare. Thus a large purchaser, 
such as the Medicaid population of the state of 
Tennessee, should easily be able to negotiate a 
contract with most vendors at well below the prevailing 
Medicaid rates, at prices only incrementally higher 
than the hospital's marginal costs5 • 
Second is the economics involved with the 
purchasing power generated by such a high volume of 
market share. With the centralization and 
concentration of the Medicaid market through TennCare's 
capitation and the state's purchasing of insurance for 
all state employees, several advantages immediately 
materialized. Of course, the sheer volume of customers 
allowed for the financially renowned 'purchasing power' 
and thus an overall ability to negotiate decreased 
prices. This 'purchasing power' was only magnified by 
the fact that physicians were told they would not be 
allowed to participate in the Tennessee Preferred 
Network (TPN) should they choose not to treat TennCare 
5 Gordon Bonnyman Jr. "Update - State Report - Stealth Reform: 
Market-Based Medicaid In Tennessee," Health Affairs (Summer 1996) : 
306-314. 
8 
patientss . This second point also relates to the vast 
transformation of the state (as well as the national) 
health care system into a capitated environment 
(capitation is explained in more detail in section 
labeled The Capitation Rate). The traditional fee-for-
service plans of yesterday were quickly being devoured 
by not only individual providers who were merging into 
wholly integrated delivery systems but also managed 
care systems seeking out new business in this now 
extremely price-sensitive marketplace. There was also 
the significant notion that once bonds and 
relationships had been formed between provider and 
customers and the rules and regulations for service had 
been embedded into memory, change may have seemed both 
unwanted and unnecessary as well as costly to customers 
for such similar medical 'products'. Market shares 
would therefore need to be formed quickly for fear of 
never capturing any substantial portion at all. 
Because of these above listed circumstances, the ready 
made customer pool located in traditional Medicaid 
programs were highly valued and inordinately attractive 
5 Gordon Bonnyman Jr. "Update - State Report - Stealth Reform: 
Market-Based Medicaid In Tennessee," Health Affairs (Summer 1996) : 
306-314. 
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to the current groups and organizations collectively 
becoming known as managed care organizationss . 
The third favorable market condition that Bonnyman 
asserts has lead to the partial success of the program 
was the sensitivity of clinical practice patterns to 
follow financial incentives. After capitated payments 
became widespread, medical treatment patterns quickly 
shifted from high intensity/high cost methods to lower 
intensity/lower cost settings. Inpatient care has been 
shifted markedly to outpatient facilities such as 
surgicenters which provide comparable care at 
strikingly reduced prices. With the complicated 
combination of these several factors TennCare was 
expected to achieve its primary goals of increased 
access, cost containment, and comparable quality. 
Although the overall premise of the plan may have 
appeared infeasible and initial results may have beeri 
less than ideal, expectations for the future 
performance of the plan are still rather encouraging. 
5Gordon Bonnyman Jr. "Update - State Report - Stealth Reform: 
Market-Based Medicaid In Tennessee," Health Affairs (Summer 1996) : 
306-314. 
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TennCare Partners Program Overview 
In July of 1996, Tennessee made history once again 
by initiating the TennCare Partners program, which was 
a managed mental health and substance abuse 'carve-out' 
of the larger TennCare program6 • [There are generally 
two types of mental health and substance abuse (MH/SA) 
plans 1) carve-outs, which consolidate all MH/SA 
services into a separate program and out - source the 
treatment from other treatment such as general medical 
care, and 2) an integrated health care system which 
combines all forms of health care into a single unified 
system of treatment. While both have their advantages 
and disadvantages, if run properly they should produce 
somewhat similar results.] The TennCare Partner's 
Program was merely regarded as a temporary solution 
from the beginning and was actually scheduled to join 
the TennCare program in early 1999, but this date has 
6 Chang C, Kiser L, Bailey J, Martins M, Gibson W, Schaberg K, 
Mirvis D, Applegate W. "Tennessee's Failed Managed Care Program 
for Mental Health and Substance Abuse Services." JAMA. 
1998:279:864-869. 
11 
been postponed for several months due to unforeseen 
administrative difficulties7 • 
Arons et al. stated in the journal of Health 
Affairs (1994), "Over time, the delivery of care and 
financing of mental health and substance abuse care 
have evolved into a complex patchwork of services. The 
result has been gaping holes in the public system for 
the poor and private insurance that runs out too 
quickly for many who could benefit from care." 
statement delineates perfectly the status of 
TennCare Partners program today. 
This 
the 
TennCare Partners has been bombarded with severe 
criticism from the get-go. An enormous loss of 
continuity of care has been noted as well as a vast 
disintegration in the traditional 'safety net' of 
system care. 
and . has al so 
It has undergone several design changes, 
been heavily influenced from outside 
sources in its overall evolution and execution8 • Other 
7 Tennessee Justice Center, Inc. "Medicaid Managed Behavioral 
Health Care: The TennCare Demonstration." 
http://www.chch.org/CHCS/gb_final.htm. 
8 Chang C, Kiser L, Bailey J, Martins M, Gibson W, Schaberg K, 
Mirvis D, Applegate W. "Tennessee's Failed Managed Care Program 
for Mental Health and Substance Abuse Services." JAMA. 
1998:279:864-869. 
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problems foreseen in the program but difficult to 
evaluate include 'adverse selection' and 'moral 
hazard', each of which is discussed below. 
Adverse selection, also labeled 'cherry picking' 
in the industry, is characterized by the concept that 
health insurance plans have incentives to discourage 
high-cost enrollees from joining, thus undermining the 
entire principle of health insurance - to collectively 
pool a group of people such that statistical data can 
be used to average health care costs over the entire 
populace. Many mental health problems are persistent 
and therefore likely to be predictable to particular 
individuals. By promoting easy access and high quality 
to low intensity/low cost care while at the same time 
creating difficult access and low quality of high 
intensi ty /high cost care, heal th insurance plans can 
effecti vely produce a quality 'twist' to render this 
adverse selection dilemma9 • If the health care 
industry is merely enrolling the healthy individuals to 
increase profits [or rather to decrease costs], the 
overall purpose of the industry is totally disregarded. 
There are multiple techniques to overcome this unwanted 
9 Frank R, McGuire T, Bae J, Rupp A. ~Solutions for Adverse 
Selections in Behavioral Health Care." Health Care Financing 
Review/Spring 1997/Volume 18, Number 3: 109-122. 
13 
side-effect, however. A MH/SA carve-out is actually 
one method used to surmount this obstacle. Carve-outs 
abet this feat by budgeting out funds specifically for 
use on mental health and substance abuse treatment and 
services; thus ensuring a specific amount of care. The 
downside to carve-outs is that they add another layer 
of administrative costs onto the already thick 
bureaucratic pie. One other means used to curb adverse 
selection is known as risk adjustment. This philosophy 





or excessive payment 
adjusting the capitation 
payment based on certain demographic characteristics -
e.g. age, sex, welfare status, and county of residence, 
and by doing so in effect protect both consumers and 
providers from financial catastrophes lO • Although this 
technique appears promising and is gaining some 
acceptance, one unfortunate difficulty is that little 
attention has been paid toward MH/SA care or costs ll 
10 Frank R, Huskamp H, McGuire T, Newhouse J. "Some Economics of 
Mental Health 'Carve-Outs'." Arch Gen Psychiatry/ Vol 53, Oct 
1996:933-937. 
11 Frank R, McGuire T, Bae J, Rupp A. "Solutions for Adverse 
Selections in Behavioral Health Care." Health Care Financing 
Review/Spring 1997/Volume 18, Number 3: 109-122. 
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(explained in detail later). Also, the TennCare 
Partners program has not implemented any sort of risk 
adjusted premiums to the behavioral health 
organizations, which obviously indicates the lack of 
data on this subject for the state of Tennessee. 
The additionally recognized potential problem of 
the TennCare Partners program labeled 'moral hazard' 
appears more easily remedied. This 'moral hazard' is 
the responsiveness of utilization to insurance coverage 
and payment. (The more co-payments and deductibles 
patients are required to pay the less likely they will 
be to utilize that particular aspect of care.) The RAND 
Heal th Insurance Experiment demonstrated that 
utilization of MH/SA treatment was twice as responsive 
to cost-sharing provisions as ordinary medical care12 • 
By forming large networks of specialty providers who 
are willing to accept· lower prices and by using 
particular techniques such as care management and 
utilization review, Tennessee managed care companies in 
the behavioral health field pledge to make more cost-
effective choices while preserving access and 
maintaining quality of care. One such example of this 
12 Frank R, Huskamp H, McGuire T, Newhouse J. "Some Economics of 
Mental Health 'Carve-Outs'." Arch Gen Psychiatry/ Vol 53, Oct 
1996:933-937. 
15 
'moral hazard' remedy involves the Massachusetts State 
government. After contracting with a carve-out firm to 
provide MH/SA benefits to almost 200,000 state and 
local employees, benefit payouts were reduced by 40%, 
and with no detectable decreases in the rate at which 
their enrollees entered treatment12 • This case vividly 
illustrates the cost containment capabilities managed 
care may bring into the health care field. Of course, 
distinct results will occur in every experiment, but 
this demonstration explicitly displays the positive 
capabilities that managed care presents for patients 
and administrators alike. Unfortunately, as of yet, 
only inadequate data has been collected for the 
TennCare Partner's Program, but complete surveys of 
results are expected soon. 
As briefly mentioned earlier, one further problem 
facing the behavioral health care industry has been the 
lack of routine sources of financing and expenditure 
information similar to that for health services 
generally even though MH/SA services are a significant 
component of all health care services. Policy makers 
12 Frank R, Huskamp H, McGuire T, Newhouse J. "Some Economics of 
Mental Health 'Carve-Outs'." Arch Gen Psychiatry/ Vol 53, Oct 
1996:933-937. 
16 
must therefore deal 
information which in 




lack of pertinent 
created numerous 
The first problem 
encountered is old spending estimates of mental health 
and substance abuse care. Even the most recent data is 
nearly fifteen years old. This creates assumptions 
based on past data that are probably inaccurate with 
present trends because of the massive shift in all of 
the health care arena. This problem is slowly being 
remedied as managed care organizations as well as other 
independent survey organizations have begun to collect 
and compare data on this understudied subj ect . The 
next difficulty deals with how the data was collected 
in many of these past studies. Each of the analyses 
usually only provides a snapshot of the mental health 
and substance abuse expenditures; none attempted to 
assess trends for future reference. This enigma is 
only compounded when combined with the last and 
possibly the most confusing predicament, the use of 
different definitions and methodologies in each of the 
surveys. These discrepancies make it nearly impossible 
to identify trends by comparing the separate surveys, 
and thus rendering the data almost completely 
inconsequential for current utilization!3. Lags in 
13 McKusick D, Mark T, King E, Harwood R, Buck J, Dilonardo J, 
17 
research notwithstanding, the distinct impression in 
the financial community is that potential savings 
associated with managed care in the mental health and 
substance abuse environment are considerably larger 
than in overall health care14 • When Massachusetts 
converted to a statewide Medicaid managed care program 
with a carve-out for MH/SA services for 375,000 
enrollees in 1992, in the first year alone it showed 
cost savings of 22% below past expenditures based on 
future projections(taking into account the higher 
administrative costs of the managed benefit)14. 
Although TennCare Partners has been marked as 
essentially a complete malfunction, much has actually 
been learned for future endeavors. One unfavorable 
lesson realized from the TennCare Partners program was 
that states contemplating similar reforms should 
consider beginning with a substantially more modest 
program to ensure a better transition between care. 
Also, for any MH/SA carve-out to be deemed even 
Genuardi J. "Spending For Mental Health And Substance Abuse 
Treatment, 1996." Health Affairs, Vol. 17, Num 5, 1998:147-157. 
14 Frank R, McGuire T, Newhouse J. "Risk Contracts in Managed 
Mental Health Care." Health Affairs, Volume 14, Number 3, 
1995:50-64. 
18 
partially successful it must promote accountability, 
decrease bureaucracy, and provide effective mechanisms 
for risk adjustments and moral hazard. Other problems 
encountered by the TennCare Partners program as well as 
other state carve-outs (such as the Massachusetts plan) 
include long delays in reaching the utilization review 
staff by telephone, excessive and time-consuming 
paperwork, conflicting responses from different 
utilization staff, differences between oral agreements 
and final written approvals, 
transmission of paperwork 
and slow or nonexistent 
to providers l5 • These 
obstacles could have been avoided had more time been 
available instead of political pressures for a quick 
implementation. However, under these particular 
circumstances this program's difficulties should be 
expected with any program this size, and in the end 
should work themselves out over time as the process 
becomes more refined and technologically capable. The 
state of Tennessee trusts that with the consolidation 
of the TennCare Partners program into the state's 
TennCare program, an improved health delivery system 
15 Callahan J, Shepard Df Beinecke R, Larson M, Cavanaugh D. 
"Mental Health/Substance Abuse Treatment In Managed Care: The 
Massachusetts Medicaid Experience." Health Affairs, Volume 14, 
Number 3, 1995:173-184. 
19 
that is wholly integrated will result. To ensure this 
outcome, however, residents of Tennessee should exert 
significant political pressures to demand greater 
accountability of their health care system. Thus, an 
overall improvement will ensue in the welfare of the 
state's residents by both promoting accountability and 
decreasing bureaucracy as stated earlier to be crucial 
for success of the program. 
20 
Cost Analysis of Health Care 
National Trends in Medicaid Spending 
As Boyd comprehensively denotes, national trends 
in Medicaid spending have been explosive. The average 
annual rate of Medicaid growth has been more than 16 
percent from 1966 to 1996, a rate far greater than the 
combined rate of growth in the population plus 
inflation, which was only 6.5 percent over this same 
periodl6 . At this rate expenditures on Medicaid would 
double at approximately every four and a half years. 
Growth from Medicaid's first full year in 1966 through 
1974 averaged 25.5 percent annuallyl7. This 
astronomical growth was due to several factors 
16 Boyd D. Medicaid Devolution - A Fiscal perspective. 
Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press: 1998. For 1966 
spending, see congressional Research Service, Medicaid Source 
Book: Background Data and Analysis (A 1993 Update), Committee 
Print, House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 103 Cong., 1 sess. 
(Government Printing Office, January 1993), p. 83. 1996 total 
computable spending (including administration) obtained from 
http://www.hcfa.gov. 
17 Congressional Research Service, Medicaid Source Book, p.B3. 
21 
including: 1) a great increase in the number of single-
parent families receiving cash assistance under the 
welfare program entitled Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC) who were categorically eligible for 
Medicaid, 2) a rapid growth in medical prices, and 3) 
the high cost of nursing home carel8 • Between 1975 and 
1981 growth expenditures began to slow, averaging only 
15.8 percent per year, but still was well above the 
combined growth in population and prices which was at 
10.1 percent. This enormous growth in Medicaid 
spending was now beginning to place tremendous pressure 
on both federal and state budgets alike. Fortunately, 





rate of only 9 percent. 
in the number of new 
During this 
recipients of 
Medicaid coverage was a mere .6 percent per year, thus 
helping to keep the overall growth of the program under 
control. However, the cost per recipient was growing 
at an average annual rate of 8.2 percent a year, a 
18 Congressional Research Service, Medicaid Source Book, pp. 85-
86, based on total computable expenditures including 
administration. See Teresa Coughlin, Leighton Ku, and John 
Holahan, Medicaid since 1980: Costs, Coverage, and the Shifting 
Alliance between the Federal Government and the States 
(Washington: Urban Institute Press, 1994), pp. 87-99. 
22 
number worthy of serious consideration and due in part 
to two important policy changes l)the federal 
government's enactment of the Omnibus Reconciliation 
Act of 1981 (OBRA81), which gave substantial incentive 
to slow program growth by reducing federal 
reimbursements to states whose spending growth exceeded 
targets tied to the medical care component of the 
consumer price index, and 2) a series of enactments 
that either mandated or allowed states to expand 
eligibility for pregnant woman and for childrenl9 • 
Medicaid expenditures again skyrocketed during the 
years 1988 to 1993, growing at a compound annual rate 
of 19.3 percent that resulted in a growth of 142 
percent in only five years20. As shown in table 4, 
growth was particularly rapid in 1991 and 1992, 
averaging 27 percent per year21. The Kaiser Commission 
on the Future of Medicaid divided this explosive growth 
19 Thompson F, DiIulio J. Medicaid and Devolution - A View from 
the States. The Brookings Institution, Washington D.C., 1998. 
20 HCFA, Health Care Financing Review, table 109. 
21 1991 and 1992 growth rates obtained from Health Care Financing 
Administration, Health Care Financing Review, 1996 Statistical 
Supplement (Baltimore, Md.:Department of Health and Human 
Services, Office of Research and Demonstrations, 1996) ,table 109. 
1995 growth rate obtained from HCFA,Medicaid Statistics: Program 
and Financial Statistics, Fiscal Year 1995, table 1. 
23 
over the five year period into these four major 
components: 38 percent was due to an increase in 
recipients, 24 percent from medical price inflation, 22 
percent from the ballooning growth of payments to 
hospitals serving disproportionate share of the 
indigent (DSH) , and the remaining 16 percent from a 
combination of increased service use, growth in 




payments for Medicare 





Medicaid expenditures have slowed to about 10 percent 
annually from 1993 to 1995, and slowed even further in 
1996 to just .1 percent. This essential slowdown in 
the past few years has been due to three dominant 
themes. One, the DSH payments have trailed off 
dramatically in recent years due to recent federal 
limitations on the program expenditures. DSH payments 
grew tremendously in two years from $902 million in 
1990 to a tremendous $17.4 billion in 1992 (up nearly 
2000 percent), and then steadied substantially. By 
1995 DSH payments had grown only slightly more, to $19 
billion in 1995 (up only 9 percent), and then finally 
22 Thompson F, DiIulio J. Medicaid and Devolution - A View from 
the States. The Brookings Institution, Washington D.C., 1998. 
24 
DSH payments decreased to $15 billion in 1996 (down 
nearly 22 percent) 23. Two, the growth in costs for 
low-income children came to an almost complete halt, 
and costs for low-income adults actually declined. 
This complete turnaround is due to more stringent state 
welfare policies, and an improving economy which has 
led to a decrease in the total number of national 
Medicaid recipients. Third, there was some slowing in 
the growth of the elderly and disabled recipients and 
in their average costs, which had been one of the 
fastest growing categories in the preceding years. 
(For a brisk synopsis of these Medicaid growth periods 
see appendix, table 2.) 
23 The source for the 1995 DSH number is HCFA, Medicaid Statistics 
1995 (1995), table 3, HCFA form 64; the source for 1996 is the 
computer-readable version of same, obtained from 
http://www.hcfa.gov. 
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Tennessee's Trends in Medicaid Spending 
Bonnyman reiterates that Medicaid has always been 
summarized by a high extent of interstate variation in 
eligibility, aid, and degree of federal funding. The 
percentage of Medicaid costs endured by the federal 
government deviates from 50 percent in the more 
prosperous states to 79 percent in the most 
impoverished states and averages 57 percent nationwide, 
with states making up the remainder. Tennessee's 
federal matching percentage was 67.7 percent in 199324 . 
Tennessee was among the top seven states in 1993 
percentage of poverty population covered by Medicaid. 
Tennessee covered 63 percent of its poor, while 
Medicaid as a whole covered only 54 percent of the 
nation's poor25. Tennessee was one of only thirty-
seven states that encompassed the medically rieedy and 
24 Congressional Research Service, Medicaid Source Book: 
Background Data and Analysis (A 1993 Update) (Washington: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1993), 485-486. 
25 J. Holahan and D. Liska, State Variations in Medicaid: 
Implications for block Grants (Washington: The Urban Institute, 
February 1994), Figure 4. Poverty figures are based on numbers of 
people below 150 percent of the federal poverty line. 
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was also relatively generous in its coverage of 
children and pregnant women. 
Mark Daniels notes [in Medicaid Reform and the 
American States] that during the five year period from 
1987 to 1992, Medicaid expenditures in Tennessee 
increased 500 percent, from $500 million to $2.5 
billion. This escalation was credited, in part, to the 
rationale affiliated with the universal escalating 
price of health care in the United States. These 
reasons included the use of costly, sophisticated 
technology; ingenious but expensive treatment of 
illnesses such as heart disease and kidney failure; the 
increasing frequency of AIDS and cancer; the increasing 
amount and longevity of the elderly persons who have an 
exceptional necessity for health care; and the therapy 
of ailments and impairments caused by alcohol and drug 
abuse26 . In . addition, this increase was due to the 
spiraling numbers of individuals eligible for Medicaid. 
During this period [from 1987 to 1992], a report issued 
by the Tennessee Department of Finance and 
Administration (DFA) estimated that the number of 
26 James M. Hoefler and Khi V. Thai, "Introduction to the 
Politics and Economics of Health Care Finance: A Symposium," 
Journal of Health and Human Resources Administration 16, no. 2 
(1993): 116, 117. 
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Medicaid-eligible individuals increased by 70 percent, 
from 507,934 to 878,981 individuals, close to 20 
percent of all Tennesseansn . 
Tennessee's Department of Finance and 
Administration also projected that Medicaid's five-year 
trend from 1987 to 1992 would result in a 220 percent 
increase in cost by 1997, or approximately $5.5 
billion, as illustrated in table 5 of appendix. Based 
on the assumption that the federal share of Medicaid 
would remain fixed at $2.5 billion, this $3 billion 
swelling would be handled with by a $851 million tax 
increase and health care benefit cuts of $2.6 
billion28 . The most profound consequence of these 
massive benefit cuts would be the loss of coverage for 
many thousands of Medicaid recipients, reductions in 
the rates of reimbursements for providers of health 
services, and further cost-shifts to insured 
patients28 • 
27 Tennessee Department of Finance and Administration, TennCare: A 
New Direction in Health Care (Nashville: State of Tennessee, 
1993) : 95. 
28Daniels M. Medicaid Reform and the American States. Auburn 
House, Westport, 1998:251-259. 
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Bonnyman notices by contrast 
matching funds of Tennessee's 
to the extravagant 
Medicaid program, 
Tennessee dawdled behind most states in the benevolence 
of its Medicaid rates and benefits prior to TennCare. 
The state ranked only forty-second in the nation in 
total Medicaid expenditures per enrollee~. 
Tennessee's disproportionate-share hospital payments 
per uninsured person placed it thirteenth in interstate 
comparison and made Tennessee a "high DSH state" 30. 
However, after adjusting for the offsetting effects of 
hospi tal taxes, aggregate hospital payments were only 
84 percent of the hospital industry's reported costs, 
compared with a national Medicaid average of 93 
percent3!. 
As indicated in table 5 of the appendix, TennCare 
has been projected to reduce annual health care 
expenditures in the state of Tennessee by $2.8 billion 
by fiscal year 1997-1998, with a cumulative savings of 
29 GAO, Medicaid: Spending Pressures, 18-19. 
30 Holahan and Liska, State variations in Medicaid, Figure 7; and 
CRS, Medicaid Source Book, 324. 
3! Prospective Payment Assessment Commission, Medicare and the 
American Health Care System: Report to Congress (Washington: 
ProPAC, June 1995), 133. 
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$7.2 billion by the end of the five year demonstration 
period32 . Similarly, 
$1.9 billion in the 
federal costs would decrease by 
fifth year of the plan, with a 
cumulative savings of $4.8 billion. Thus, the program 
anticipated substantial cost savings for both the state 
and federal governments. An analysis by the United 
States Government Accounting Office indicated that of 
four states with broad waivers as of mid 1995, only 
TennCare could realistically be expected to reduce 
federal Medicaid expenditures over the life of the 
demonstration proj ect33 . 
As shown by these astounding statistics, TennCare 
was expected to be relatively successful in its use of 
managed care to contain Medicaid spending costs. The 
results thus far have not completely met expectations 
but are nonetheless on the appropriate track. 
Significant cracks in the fiscal base of the program 
emerged immediately, however, and in the first year 
alone, TennCare incurred a deficit of $99 million. 
Although, this was due in part to unanticipated billing 
32 Mirvis D, Chang C, Hall C, Zaar G, Applegate W. "TennCare-
Health System Reform for Tennessee." JAMA. 1995:274:1235-1241. 
33 Medicaid: Spending Pressures Drives States Toward Program 
Reinvention. Washington, DC: US GAO; 1995. 
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errors which attributed to the failure in collection 
of $37 million in premiums from enrollees34 . The state 
maintains, however, that this shortage is meager when 
contrasted with what the deficit would have been had 
the old Medicaid system remained in place. The state 
also claims that after just the first eighteen months 
of the program an estimated $1.6 billion in state and 
federal funds had been conserved based on the 
projection of the expected growth rate in conventional 
Medicaid expenditures. The current annual budget of 
the TennCare program has reached a level of nearly $3.7 
billion in 1998, well below the projected annual budget 
of the traditional Medicaid program at $7.7 billion34 • 
This experiment's results are obviously no trivial feat 
thus far, and hopefully the outcome will proceed to 
travel in both the appropriate direction and continue 
to accelerate its beneficial momentum .. 
34 Mirvis D, Chang C, Hall C, Zaar G, Applegate W. "TennCare -
Health System Reform for Tennessee."JAMA,1995:274:1235-1241. 
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The Capitation Rate 
The essence of the TennCare program lies in its 
capitation rate. [The capitation rate is the fixed, 
predetermined payment made to a vendor of health care 
(managed care organizations in this case) in exchange 
for medical services for a designated period of time. 
This capitation rate is also known as the per-member, 
per-month (PMPM) fee.] After months of negotiations 
with HCFA over the projected annual budget, an initial 
annual budget for TennCare of $2,192,950,800 was 
established. 
installed an 
Based on this annual budget, the state 
annual capitation rate of $1641 per 
person. This capitation rate was then discounted by 
the anticipated continuing charity care, local 
government contributions, and average co-payments by 
beneficiaries, so that the average per capita rate 
actually paid to managed care organizations for each 
enrollee was initially set at $1214 per year34. This 
rate was then 'risk adjusted' based on several 
demographic factors such as race, gender, age, et 
cetera. For example, the rate of children aged 1 
34 Mirvis D, Chang C, Hall C, Zaar G, Applegate W. "TennCare -
Health System Reform for Tennessee." JAMA,1995:274:1235-1241. 
32 
through 13 years was $607 per year while that for the 
blind and disabled was $3789 annually. [All providers, 
ie, physicians, hospitals, and so forth, are paid by 
the MCOs based on negotiated rates; the state is not 
involved in establishing provider rates.] 
The capitation rate is perhaps the most critical -
and controversial - issue of the TennCare program. The 
state compared its proposed capitation rate to its 
prior experience with the state run plan for state 
employees as well as prior experience with Medicaid 
populations. The Insurance Administration of the 
Tennessee Department of Finance and Administration 
determined that the average health benefits paid by the 
state per state employee in fiscal year 1991-1992 was 
$1194.40. After out-of-pocket expenses of $268.86 are 
added and inflationary costs to 1994 dollars are also 
included, the total per capita cost for the state 
employee plan comes to $1664 a year, almost exactly the 
same as the initial TennCare per capita rate of 
$164134 • This TennCare figure of $1641 per member also 
coincides extremely well to the national average for 
health maintenance organizations - $1636 per enrollee 
34 Mirvis D, Chang C, Hall C, Zaar G, Applegate W. "TennCare -
Health System Reform for Tennessee." JAMA,1995:274:1235-1241. 
33 
per year35 • Thus, the state argued that the 
anticipated TennCare rates would be comparable to both 
reported Medicaid and state employee per capita rates 
in Tennessee (taking into account Tennessee's specific 
demographics), as well as to commercially managed care 
fees across the nation. 
The managed care organizations involved with 
TennCare argued fervently that the initial capitation 
rate of $1641 per member per year was substantially 
below expected costs of treating their patients. The 
managed care organizations questioned the validity and 
the value of the comparisons, stating only limited 
correlations were truly accurate. Mirvis rationalizes 
the seven crucial distinctions between the state 
comparison group and the actual TennCare population. 
First, TennCare was going to provide a more 
extensive assortment of benefits than· did the 
traditional Medicaid program. By logical deduction, 
one must assume that with additional services must come 
additional costs. Second, enhanced entry to assistance 
by the formerly uninsured might swell use of services 
over that under Medicaid. This theory, as the managed 
care organizations asserted, implied that the increase 
35 Managed Care Digest. Kansas City, Mo: Marion Merrell Dow; 
1994. 
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in availability of medical services would also increase 
the usage of these services. Third, the TennCare 
population would presumably be more heavily ailing than 
either the state employee group or enrollees in 
commercial health maintenance organizations due to a 
lack of knowledge of the system as well as a generally 
substandard welfare status contrasted to the comparison 
group. Fourth, it has been asserted that the state 
profoundly miscalculated the former expenditures of 
Medicaid. The state had presumed that all preceding 
beneficiaries had received an entire year of coverage, 
when in actuality the average duration of coverage was 
only 8.7 months. Hence, true annual expenditures per 
person were notably larger than the state had 
originally calculated. Data from the United States 
Government Accounting Office, for example, list 1993 
per capita spending on health care at $2943 
considerably higher than the TennCare capitation rate. 
Fifth, whereas the base capitation rate of $1641 may be 
around other similar benchmarks, the real rate 
reimbursed to managed care organizations was reduced by 
approximately 25 percent to $1214 per enrollee. This 
in turn meant that MCOs would have to secure their 
provided services at a reduction of 25 percent over 
prevailing rates, a discount that is substantially 
higher than the cost savings reported by other managed 
35 
care systems at this time~,TI. Sixth, the entire 
system of capitation did not contribute for the start-
up costs of the managed care organizations. This 
alarmed the managed care organizations because start-up 
costs were postulated to be fairly significant. 
Finally, the inclusion of a 5 percent charity 
contribution entices cost shifting into the design and 
recognizes that some citizens will continue to be 
uninsured or underinsured despite TennCare38 • [Cost 
shifting is when one agency reduces its own 
expenditures by inducing another agency to pay for 
similar services39 .1 However, Mirvis contends that the 
health conditions of the potential TennCare 
beneficiaries may not be sufficiently represented by 
36 Assessing the Design and Implementation of TennCare. 
Washington, DC: National Association of Public Hospitals; 1993. 
37 Hurley RE, Freund DA, Pual JE. Managed Care in Medicaid. Ann 
Arbor, Mich: Health Administration Press; 1993. 
38 Assessing the Design and Implementation of TennCare. 
Washington, DC: National Association of Public Hospitals; 1993. 
39 Norton E, Lindrooth R, Dickey B. Cost Shifting in a Mental 
Health Carve-Out for the AFDC Population. Health Care Financing 
Review/Spring 1997/ Volume 18, Number 3. 
36 
the current group of Medicaid recipients because many 
qualified enrollees join into Medicaid only after they 
become ill. Thus, enrollment of healthy eligible 
citizens may reduce the overall severity level, and 
cost, of the total eligible TennCare population. For 
instance, children and their parents from low-income 
single-parent families a group that may parallel 
newly covered citizens comprised 72 percent of 
Medicaid beneficiaries but only 32 percent of Medicaid 
payments40. Mirvis also remarks that other monetary 
concerns may also have a bearing on the accomplishments 
of the program. The suggested annual rate of 
development of the global TennCare budget is tied to 
the expansion of the state's economy. This 
justification, while delineating comprehensive outlays, 
is separate from future health system needs. Health 
care costs may run either below or above the general 
state growth, and therefore should not be linked 
directly to the state's health care budget as debated 
by the managed care organizations. Finally, not all 
health care costs are funded through TennCare. For 
example, long-term care is funded under traditional 
Medicaid reimbursement rules, so that MCOs do not have 
40 Blendon RJ, Donelan K, Hill C, et ale Medicaid beneficiaries 
and health reform. Health Affairs (Millwood). 1993; 12:132-143. 
37 
full control over all resources to care for their 
enrollees41 . 
Arguments such as these are quite convincing for 
both sides, but a decision had to be made and in the 
end the government always seems to prevail. The 
initial capitation rate of $1641 went into effect at 
the program's initiation, and considering that several 
of the original MCOs, shown in table 6, are still 
providing services for the TennCare program, one must 
surmise that the initial rate must have been somewhat 
accurate. To fully understand how competitive this 
market has become, one must also note that several of 
the managed care organizations have reported financial 
deficits in the millions of dollars. The 'Survival of 




these managed care organizations, and 
this rule has already begun to take 
of the MCOs has already gone out of 
business and several others are in precarious financial 
situations. However, this is part of the business 
world, and events such as this must occur to ensure the 
most economically efficient and effective markets. As 
shown in table 7, national stock prices of HMOs have 
41 Mirvis D, Chang C, Hall C, Zaar G, Applegate W. "TennCare -
Health System Reform for Tennessee." JAMA,1995:274:1235-1241. 
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consistently outperformed the overall markets index, at 
a level almost three times as high today. Moving back 
to Tennessee statistics, table 8 illustrates that 
although costs per patient per day have steadily 
increased at a pace of approximately 10 percent a year 
for the past years, they have begun to level off to 
today. Table 8 also shows a rates near 3 percent 
substantial decline in the average 
patients per day seen in Tennessee 
indicates the enormous financial 
TennCare program. 
daily census of 
hospitals, which 
savings of the 
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Quality and Access of Care 
By the end of its first year, TennCare enrollment 
had reached 1.27 million people, including 850,000 
former Medicaid recipients and 419,000 persons formerly 
uninsured. This translates into slightly more than 25 
percent of the state's almost 5 million residents. 
Also, the increase in the percentage of Tennesseans 
under the age of 65 with health insurance increased 
from 89 percent in 1993 to 95 percent in 1994 the 
highest of any state. A telephone survey conducted by 
the University of Tennessee's Center for Business and 
Economic Research in August of 1994 indicated that 
between private insurance and TennCare, 94.6 percent of 
the state's total population were covered by some form 
of health care coverage - once again the closest level 
any state had reached toward universal· coverage of its 
population42 • Figures have since indicated a 
fluctuation in enrollment from 1.27 million persons in 
1994 to 1.18 million in 1995, down nearly 80,000 
enrollees. This was due in part to the newly elected 
Governor Don Sunquist, who has quietly attempted a 
42 W. Fox and W. Lyons, "A Survey to Determine Insurance Status of 
Tennessee Residents" (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Center 
for Business and Economic Research, August 1994). 
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number of tactics to reduce enrollment. These 
strategies include the following as expounded by Gordon 
Bonnyman: "higher premiums and more aggressive 
collection from waiver eligibles, more stringent 
eligibility verification, and closure of enrollment to 
new uninsureds" 43. The enrollee population has since 
been expanded to nearly 1.29 million residents of which 
818,00 are Medicaid eligibles and 470,000 are 
uninsured/uninsurable«. 
On February 5, 1996, a little more than two years 
after the program was started, TennCare released the 
first reports compiled from patient data submitted by 
the MCOs. The plans were required to report all 
encounters not just samples, and this ,information was 
to provide the foundation for TennCare's quality 
assurance program. However, the state had formerly 
declined to distribute the figures to HCFA, state 
politicians or the populace stating that the data was 
unfinished or questionable, and demanded further 
43 Bonnyman G. Center For Health Care Strategies. TennCare: Where 
It Stands Today - - March 1996. 
http://www.chcs.org/CHCS/gb_march.htm 
44 TennCare Fact Sheet. TennCare Home Page. 
http://www.state.tn.us.health/tenncare 
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development. The reports are suspected of declaring 
that primary care access under TennCare was superior to 
both that seen by former Medicaid recipients or 
comparable figures reported by a commercial managed 
care plans45 . At the time of its release, however, the 
details supplied by the managed care organizations had 
not yet been substantiated, and the publicity spin of 
the state reports had brought abundant suspicion among 
the public. 
Although no official reports were released at the 
program's inception, tremendous problems promptly 
surfaced. The managed care organization's ability to 
serve their enrollees were supposedly grossly 
inadequate when the program began. There were also 
critical marketing exploits, 
in a number of communities. 
some amounting to fraud, 
Access to particular 
hospital care, was medical services, or 
troublesome in some areas. 
for the continuity of 
vulnerable populations, 
essential providers who 
encouraged hundreds of 
even 
Serious disruptions arose 
care for the especially 





45 Bonnyman G. Center For Health Care Strategies. TennCare: Where 
It Stands Today - - March 1996. 
http://www.chcs.org/CHCS/gb_march.htm 
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uninsured residents to apply for the new coverage, but 
it was several months before computer systems and 
administrative procedures were developed to handle the 
situation and process the applications. In one 
particular example, a state contractor had failed to 
inform enrollees of their premium liability or even 
where to send their payments for several months. 
Patient encounter data, which was essential to the 
state's ability to monitor quality assurance and access 
statistics, were supposed to be submitted by managed 
care organizations' standard electronic format as 
stated above. However, the incomplete data received 
eventually led to the state's partially withholding 
capitation payments to further compel the collection 
and compilation of the information. Recently, however, 
TennCare has had reports released stating that primary 
care access under the new program is superior to that 
enjoyed by Medicaid beneficiaries before the plan was 
implemented as well as superior to comparable figures 
reported by commercial managed care plans45 • These 
surveys, as shown in table 9 of appendix, show that the 
perceived quality of care for both heads of households 
as well as their children are rated at rates slightly 
45Bonnyman G. Center For Health Care Strategies. TennCare: Where 
It Stands Today - - March 1996. 
http://www.chcs.org/CHCS/gb_march.htm 
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below former Medicaid proportions. It is not 
surprising that satisfaction with TennCare itself is 
lower than for the former Medicaid program, given the 
fact that TennCare places its patients in a managed 
care environment which obviously restricts patient 
autonomy somewhat. Although the satisfaction 
assessments for TennCare were somewhat below the 
previous Medicaid program levels of satisfaction in the 
first year of the programs existence, they are 
nonetheless on the rise. The survey results, table 9, 
show a definite positive trend toward patient 
satisfaction over not only the individual years 
observed, but also the life of the project as an 
entirety to rates which are comparable to former 
Medicaid satisfaction levels of the past. 
Chang et a1 46 • unfortunately acknowledge that 
although TennCare has become a potentially successful 
heal th reform program, the TennCare Partners program 
has all but deteriorated into a crisis. The 10 percent 
retention of capitation payments such as in the 
46 chang C, Kiser L, Bailey J, Martins M, Gibson W, Schaberg K, 
Mirvis D, Applegate W. "Tennessee's Failed Managed Care Program 
for Mental Health and Substance Abuse Services." JAMA. 
1998:279:864-869. 
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TennCare program has unfavorably continued until today 
for the Premier behavioral health organization involved 
in the TennCare Partners program because of the plan's 
noncompliance with its contractual obligations to its 
enrollees. Premier, in turn, has withheld this 10 
percent from its network providers, and has also given 
the state notice of intent to terminate its contract in 
June of 1999. State officials are dismissing the 
statement as mere posturing, however. This example 
ominously illustrates the dire state of affairs for the 
entire TennCare Partners program. The TennCare 
Partners plan has been marred with difficulties in 
quality since its inception. As described beforehand, 
many patients did not obtain care or lost continuity of 
care for quite some time, and the traditional 'safety 
net' for mental health nearly vaporized. Numerous 
added difficulties stemmed from the state's attempt to 
preserve the primary regulatory control, reducing the 
ability of the behavioral health organization managers 
to design and implement the state's plans effectively. 
For instance, the state permitted enrollees to appeal 
behavioral health organization denials of service and 
then overturned many of these denials. This clearly 
diminished the behavioral health organization's 
capability to competently perform any model of case 
management. The state also mandated that patients 
45 
could not be moved from their previous levels of care 
during the first three months of conversion. These and 
other state regulations undoubtably hampered the 
behavioral health organization's ability to 
successfully manage behavioral health care and operate 
case management appropriately46. 
TennCare Partners has been pronounced by Chang to 
be cursed by three serious blemishes46 • First, the 
program lacks a single centralization point of 
accountability. TennCare Partners detaches 
responsibility for an individual's physical and mental 
health care between a paired BHO and MCO that are paid 
by a capitation basis separately by the state. These 
'partners' in turn quarrel amongst themselves about 
service and payment responsibilities, irrevocably 
leading to cost shifting. As Mechanic states, "The 
dispersion of mental health care among so many 
different sectors and varying budget streams allows 
many opportunities to shift costs and responsibilities 
to others, which also gives the appearance of cost 
46 chang C, Kiser L, Bailey J, Martins M, Gibson w, Schaberg K, 
Mirvis D, Applegate W. ~Tennessee's Failed Managed Care Program 
for Mental Health and Substance Abuse Services." JAMA. 
1998:279:864-869. 
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savings47 ." Secondly, TennCare Partners spreads its 
global budget across the entire population covered by 
TennCare and links Behavioral Health Organizations 
(BROs) capitation revenues to overall TennCare 
enrollment. This leads to a dire problem - should the 
TennCare enrollment level rise, the BHOs theoretically 
should benefit financially, and should the TennCare 
enrollment level fall, the opposite should ensue. The 
predicament that develops from this cycle is that there 
only appears to be a downside for the BHOs. The 
TennCare enrollment level is capped by budgetary 
constraints whereas enrollees are always able to drop 
out at their discretion. This leads to a vicious 
series that leaves the behavioral health organizations 
in an unfortunate and ill-fated situation. The third 
and final problem that has been expressed by Chang et 
al. with the TennCare Partners program is that it uses 
a single capitation rate with no risk adjustment to pay 
all of the behavioral health organizations. As 
discussed previously in the capitation section, an 
appropriate capitation rate is vital for the assurance 
of both quality care and company survival. With the 
simplistic capitation rate of the TennCare Partners 
47 Mechanic D. Emerging Trends In Mental Health Policy and 
Practice. Health Affairs - Volume 17, Number 6, 1998: 82-98. 
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program the differences of severity of illness are 
entirely ignored. This is a detriment to both the 
payor and the enrollee. Obviously the vendor loses 
dramatically in the financial aspects of business if 
only being paid a single rate to treat multiple levels 
of illness with most of the patients falling on the 
'severely ill' end of the spectrum. This would 
inevitably lead to adverse selection, an entirely 
undesirable side effect. The enrollees who are 
severely ill, known as the 
in turn because of this 
'priority population', lose 
adverse selection dilemma. 
Thus, with the disproportionate loss of healthier 
enrollees and the retention of the more ailing 
population, BHOs stand to further lose in their total 
capitation payments contrasted with their total 
expenses. These scatterings of design flaws, along 
with severe tight budgetary constraints that have made 
little provisions for reserve funds and start-up costs, 
have inescapably exposed the patients, providers, as 
well as the individual behavioral health organizations 
to unreasonable amounts of risks48 . 
48 Chang C, Kiser L, Bailey J, Martins M, Gibson W, Schaberg K, 
Mirvis D, Applegate W. "Tennessee's Failed Managed Care Program 
for Mental Health and Substance Abuse Services." JAMA. 
1998:279:864-869. 
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TennCare and TennCare Partners Analysis 
For one to completely understand the potential of 
these two programs it is first vital to review the most 
fundamental aspect, the political staying power. Mark 
Daniels states the first implication realized from 
Tennessee's experience was that the politics of health 
care is just as important as its content or 
structure49 . TennCare and TennCare Partners have thus 
far weathered the transition from a Democratic to a 
Republican Administration, 
market conditions agree 
political climate of cost 
and advocates' adoration of 
favorably with this new 
containment and budgetary 
regulations. As Bonnyman so articulately states, 
"TennCare has been linked to perestroika in the former 
Soviet bloc: It is a reform process that, once 
initiated, is difficult to reverse. Indeed, like the 
'shock therapy' being administered to East European 
economies, the very chaos and dislocations that 
TennCare has produced confound those who would turn 
49 Daniels M. Medicaid Reform and the American States. Auburn 
House, Westport, 1998:251-259. 
49 
back the clock5o ." Thompson reiterates this element 
with the following narration, " Governors and 
legislatures in such states as Tennessee and Minnesota 
have, for instance, served as catalysts for innovations 
that strive to achieve a better balance among access, 
quality, and cost in the Medicaid program. In shaping 
the program, state policy makers respond to multiple 
factors, including the policy legacy of their state as 
reflected in previous decisions of political leaders 
concerning Medicaid and the institutional 
configurations that have evolved over time from these 
choices51 ." This political power is not something to 
be taken lightly; without such influential governmental 
strength TennCare possibly might not have been 
implemented at all, let alone survived until today. 
Added dimensions that should also be observed of 
the two plans involve the attainment of their goals and 
objectives as well as where the programs are going to 
be directed in the future. As shown above, the 
programs differ markedly in the attainment of their 
50 Bonnyman G."Update -State Report-Stealth Reform:Market-Based 
Medicaid In Tennessee,"Health Affairs (Summer 1996): 306-314. 
51 Thompson F, DiIulio J. Medicaid and Devolution - A View from 
the States. The Brookings Institution, Washington D.C., 1998. 
50 
separate purposes. Whereas TennCare has achieved 
substantial cost containment, noticeably increased 
access for the uninsured/uninsurable, and preserved 
parallel quality standards; TennCare Partners has all 
but dissolved entirely. Fortuitously, TennCare 
Partners is scheduled to presently fuse with TennCare 
to fashion one, wholly integrated system of care for 
the entire state of Tennessee. A myriad of researchers 
believe the consolidation of the two programs to be a 
long overdue necessity. Although David Mechanic speaks 
of mental health and substance abuse programs in 
general and not specifically on the TennCare Partners 
program, his ensuing quote is nonetheless quite 
appropriate, \\ Hospi tal and community care are poorly 
coordinated, and hospital care needs to be integrated 
into a more balanced system of services52 ." 
Hopefully, this union will alleviate the somber 
difficulties associated with the unconsolidated program 
such as the lack of continuity of care [at least this 
problem should not occur again], shortage of care in 
catastrophic instances, or deficiency in either access 
to essential mental health/substance abuse care or 
MH/SA treatment centers. 
52 Mechanic D. Emerging Trends In Mental Health Policy and 
Practice. Health Affairs - Volume 17, Number 6, 1998: 82-98. 
51 
One final, and feasibly most pivotal element to 
survey is the public and physician response to the 
massive transformations that have transpired through 
these two unique programs. Although enrollee support 




since then advocacy has flourished 
In TennCares first year only 49 percent 
clients claimed that the care provided 
under TennCare was either the same as or better than 
the care provided under the previous Medicaid system, 
whereas 51 percent stated that the care given through 
TennCare was worse than the care previously provided 
under Medicaid53 . As of 1998, slightly more than 80 
percent of the TennCare population affirmed they were 
satisfied with their health coverage54 • It is of the 
utmost importance that the people for which these 
programs are meant to operate are pleased with the 
results, and judging by the these astounding statistics 
these same individuals seem to be content with the 
53 Pearson R. Health Care II: Status of TennCare. The Frank M. 
Norfleet Forum for the advancement of health. UTM, 1995: 14-23. 
54 Department of Health - Tennessee. More TennCare Enrollees Say 
Quality of Care Excellent. Nashville, March 11, 1998. 
http://www.state.tn.us/cgi-bin/hea ... wwwroot/health/news/items/tc14.txt 
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results that have occurred. One technicality that 
should be acknowledged, however, is that few patients 
actually utilize the care that it is afforded, and 
therefore patient satisfaction data may be skewed 
slightly. If a client is not seeking medical help, 
than he/she will probably reply in a positive fashion 
when surveyed of his/her health care coverage. 
Nonetheless, these feasible miscalculations should 
statistically occur in coinciding proportions from 
program to program, so overall trends of performance 
may be compared with reasonable accuracy. 
While patients appear to be fairly appeased with 
the program as a whole, physicians differ noticeably in 
conviction. In 1994, a survey was taken of physicians 
across the state, and 86 percent of Tennessee doctors 
noted TennCare as either unsatisfactory or totally 
unacceptable55 . This original disapproval by 
physicians was due to several significant factors, but 
it is likely that this was just an initial reaction to 
the possibility (and likelihood) of a decrease in 
salaries. First, while multitudinous suggestions were 
provided by the Tennessee Medical Association, not one 
single substantive physician recommendation was 
55 Pearson R. Health Care II: Status of TennCare. The Frank M. 
Norfleet Forum for the advancement of health. UTM, 1995: 14-23. 
53 
included in the TennCare program55 . Secondly, 
physicians were troubled with not only administrative 
difficulties, but also enrollee problems. Many 
patients had a complete lack of understanding of the 
plan, and this unfortunately induced turbulent access 
dilemmas. Physicians' third distress over the program 
involved the sentiment of inadequate benefits coverage 
by the managed care organizations. This also blended 
in with the fourth distressing factor for physicians -
restrictive drug formularies. The final tension among 
doctors engrossed the disruption/termination of 
physician/patient relationships55. These intricacies 
combined to fashion a tautly bound fabric of tension 
between Tennessee physicians and the administrative 
staff of TennCare. To demonstrate their displeasure 
with the plan, Tennessee physicians sent over 1200 
faxes to HCFA officials in less than one week's time. 
The members of the Tennessee Medical Association also 
raised over $1 million toward a lawsuit against the 
state56 . A survey taken in 1994 also revealed that due 
55 Pearson R. Health Care II: Status of TennCare. The Frank M. 
Norfleet Forum for the advancement of health. UTM, 1995: 14-23. 
56 Daniels M. Medicaid Reform and the American States. Auburn 
House, Westport, 1998:251-259. 
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to continued problems with the TennCare plan, the 
program might incur a 15 to 20 percent reduction in the 
future supply of providers57 . This viability proved 
correct and by just a few short months after the 
initiation of TennCare the Tennessee Preferred Network 
(TPN), a preferred provider program operated by Blue 
Cross/Blue Shield of Tennessee, roster of participating 
physicians had fallen dramatically from around 6,500 to 
3,500. Nevertheless, with TPN's immense market share, 
nearly all original physicians had returned to the plan 
within just a year58 • This 'cram-down' requirement, 
requiring any provider who participated in TPN to treat 
the network's TennCare enrollees, brought heavy 
assaults from the physicians. Due to the immense 
purchasing clout of the plan, however, physicians were 
essentially helpless against opposing it58 • 
With all of these elaborate pieces working both 
collectively and opposite each other, it is exceedingly 
perplexing to summarize the program as an entirety. It 
57 Pearson R. Health Care II: Status of TennCare. The Frank M. 
Norfleet Forum for the advancement of health. UTM, 1995: 14-23. 
58 Gordon Bonnyman Jr. "Update - State Report - Stealth Reform: 
Market-Based Medicaid In Tennessee," Health Affairs (Summer 1996) : 
306-314. 
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is in my 
the 
opinion, however, to express my conclusion 
that 
misfortunes, 
program, although incurring numerous 
has nonetheless been an enormous step in 
the proper direction. Costs have been contained, 
access has been increased, and quality has been held 
constant in this valiant effort to save the health care 
industry in the state of Tennessee. I believe that 
with the anticipated integration the two programs 
TennCare and TennCare Partners the heal th care of 
Tennesseans will vastly improve while stabilizing the 
budget of the state. This sentiment is also perceived 
by a majority of researchers studying this subject 
including Bonnyman as he wri tes, "the TennCare 
experience, for all of its problems, suggests that the 
savings from capitated managed care are substantial and 
that they can be applied to our most profound health 
policy challenge: protecting the millions of Americans 
now without health insurance58 ." 
58Gordon Bonnyman Jr. "Update - State Report - Stealth Reform: 
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Table 1 
Annual Change in National Per Capita Health Care Expenditures, 1990-1997 











expenditures(1) index(2) establishments(3) 
6.40% 5.50% 5.40% 
4.20% 3.10% 4.90% 
5.00% 4.40% 4.40% 
3.20% 3.10% 2.80% 
2.20% 0.70% 1.90% 
1.30% 1.20% 1.90% 
1.20% 0.90% 2.40% 
* 1.80% 3.60% 
Notes: Data presented here are adjusted for general inflation. Adjustment is based on the chain-type gross domestic product 
(GDP) price index developed by the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economics Analysis. 
1.From the National Health Accounts database at the Health Care Financing Administration, National Cost Estimates Unit. 
2.Calculations by Ginsburg and Gabel using data from Milliman and Robertson's Health Cost Index database, expanded to 
include Medicare. 
3.From U.S. Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment, Hours, and Earnings database. Payroll calculated as 
the product of production workers, average hours per week, and average hourly wage. 
* Not Available. 
Annual Change Per Capita In National Health Care Expenditures, By Component, 1990-1997 
Year Total Health Hospital PhYSician Drug 
1990 10.10% 9.40% 9.60% 14.70% 
1991 7.10% 7.10% 5.70% 12.40% 
1992 7.30% 7.80% 5.00% 11.70% 
1993 5.80% 6.50% 3.70% 7.10% 
1994 3.20% 3.00% 2.50% 4.70% 
1995 3.80% 3.10% 3.20% 10.90% 
1996 3.20% 2.90% 1.40% 11.30% 
1997 3.90% 2.40% 2.00% 11.50% 
Source: Ginsburg and Gabel calculations using data from Milliman and Robertson's Health Cost Index database, expanded to 
include Medicare. 
Note: Data presented here not adjusted for inflation. 
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1 )Recipients nearly doubled due in large part to AFDC 
growth (those categorically eligible for Medicaid) 
2)Rapid medical price inflation, especially for nursing 
homes 
1 ) Essentially no recipient growth, despite rise in poverty 
2)Rapid general and Medicaid price inflation 
1 )OBRA81 allowed greater cost containment -
especially affecting the early years of this period 
2)Mandated and optional expansions began to take 
hold in later years 
1 )Increases in disabled and elderly recipients; disabled 
growth driven in part by Supreme Court decision and 
outreach efforts 
2)Tenfold increase in DSH payments 
3)Growth in AFDC caseloads due to increase in single-
parent households and 1990-1991 recession 
1 )New federal limits on DSH payments reduce 
payments to some states 
2)Improving economy and AFDC declines 
3)SIowing medical price inflation 
4)Elderly and disabled account for 85 percent of growth 
in payments 
Source: Thompson F, Dilulio J. Medicaid and Devolution, 1998. 
Table 3 
National Enrollment in Medicaid Managed Care as Percentage of Total 
Medicaid Enrollment, 1991-1996 
Managed Total Percent 
Care Medicaid enrolled in 
enrollment enrollment managed 
Year (millions) ~millions) care 
1991 2.7 28.3 9.5 
1992 3.6 30.9 11.8 
1993 4.8 33.4 14.4 
1994 7.8 33.6 23.2 
1995 9.8 33.4 29.4 
1996 13.3 33.2 40.1 
Source: http://WWW.hcfa.gov/medicaid/trends1.htm. 
National Summary of Medicaid Managed Care Programs and Enrollment 
30-Jun-97 
Plan Type 
Health Insuring Organization 
Health Maintainance Organizationl Federally Qualified 
Health Maintainance Organizationl State Plan Defined 
Primary Care Case Management 




















*This total number of enrollees includes 4,111,379 individuals who were enrolled in more than one 
managed care plan. It also includes individuals enrolled in State health care reform programs that 













National Medicaid Spending Growth Rates 
O+-~~~--~--~~~-.--~--~--~~---r--~--.-~--~ 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Sources: 1982-93 growth rates obtained from Health Care Financing Administration 
(HCFA), Health Care Financing Review: 1996 Statistical Supplement (Baltimore: HHS 
Office of Research and Demonstrations, 1996), table 109; 1994-95 growth rates 
obtained from HCFA, Medicaid Statistics: Program and Financial Statistics Fiscal 
Year 1995, table 1; 1996 growth rates based on growth in total computable 
expenditures for 1996 obtained from data file mfn96t01.xls, as compared with total 
expenditures for 1995 obtained from HCFA, Medicaid Statistics, table 1. 
CD 
C) 
Growth in Real Per Capita National 
Health Expenditures, 1970-2007 
c 8 r-------------------------------------------------~ 
~ 7 




Ci 1 ::s 2 0 r---~----~----_r----_.----,_----~----r_----~--~ 
~ 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 
Source: Health Care Financing Administration, Office of the Actuary. 
Notes: National health expenditures (NHE) are deflated by the gross domestic product 
(GOP) deflator. Much of the increase shown for 1998 reflects a sharp decline in the 
deflator rather than an increase in nominal NHE. Figures after 1996 are projections. 
Table 5 
Projected Medicaid and TennCare Expeditures, Fiscal Years 1993·1994 
Health Care Program Expenses 
and Savings 
1993-1994 1994-1995 1995-1996 1996-1997 
TennCare expenses 
Total 3131.6 3176.6 3331.8 3496.7 
Federal Title XIX 2107.8 2119.4 2223 2333.1 
Medicaid expenses 
Total 3384.9 3965.9 4662.7 5498.2 
Federal Title XIX 2267.1 2653.3 3120.6 3681.2 
TennCare savings 
Total 253.3 789.3 1330.9 2001.5 
Federal Title XIX 159.3 533.9 897.6 1348.1 
Source: Mirvis et al. JAMA, October 18, 1995 - Vol 274, No.15. 
Values are in millions of dollars. 
Total and Per Capita Spending - TennCare Partners* 
Total program costs 
Minus state administration cost 
Total Funds Available for Capitation 
Numbers of Eligibles 
TennCare priority population 
Non-TennCare priority population 
TennCare non priority population 
Total 
Rates and per Capita costs 
Per Capita rate per 12 months 
Per capita rate per month 
Spending estimates if business as usual 





















Bureau of TennCare 

























*Eligibles by MCO as of 01/09/99 
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HMO Mergers And Acquisitions, Number And Value, 1987-
1997 
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
1_ Mergers and Acquisitions -.-Number of Transactions I 
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Stock Price Performance of HMOs, Health Services Companies, And 
Overall Stock Market, 1987-1997 
O+---~~---T-----r----~----r---~----~----~----~----~~ 
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
1---Overall Market Index --.- Health Services Index Level -*- HMO Index Level I 
Source: Prepared for the Kaiser Foundation by the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), University of Chicago, 14 
January 1998. 
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1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
, ___ Patients PerDay +Cost per Adjusted Patient Day I 
The Average number of patients in a facility on any day of the reporting year. Source: Tenn. Dep. of Health, Health Statistics and Information Health 
Access Update, 1994, 1995, and 1996. 
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TennCare Better or Worse: Former Medicaid 
Respondents, 1994-1995 
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18 Principles for Managed Care Companies 
1. Accessibility of services: To ensure access to quality care, health plans should have enough 
physicians, specialists and other providers to provide timely, appropriate care 24 hours a day, seven days 
a week; provide women members with direct access to obstetricians and gynecologists; provide access to 
specialists and specialty care centers; provide out-of-network referrals at no cost to the member when the 
plan does not have a network physician with the appropriate training or experience; and provide health 
care materials and services in a culturally and linguistically sensitive manner. 
2. Choice of health plans: Individuals should be given a choice of health plans. 
3. Confidentiality of health plan information: Health plans should ensure that the confidentiality of 
member or patient information is protected. Information should not be disclosed except: if necessary 
for quality assurance, for purchasers or providers (to determine eligibility for coverage or to administer 
payments), or to conduct research (but these data should not contain patient identifiers); if the individual 
provides consent; or if required by law or court order. 
4. Continuity of care: Members should be allowed to choose their own PCP and change their PCP at 
any time. Members who are being treated for a serious illness or who are in the second trimester or 
pregnancy should be allowed to continue to receive treatment from their physician specialist for up to 
60 days or through post-partum when their doctors' contracts are terminated by a plan. 
5. Disclosure of information to consumers: Information should be given to consumers, such as a 
description of the coverage provided and excluded, how to obtain service, select providers and obtain 
medically necessary referrals; members' cost-sharing methodologies used to compensate physicians; 
procedures for utilization management; a description of restrictive prescription drug formularies; 
procedures for receiving emergency care and out-of-network services; procedures for determining 
coverage for investigational or experimental treatments; use of arbitration; disenrollment data; and how 
to appeal decisions, file grievances and contact consumer organizations. 
6. Coverage of emergency care: Health plans should cover emergency services, including services 
provided when a layperson reasonably believes he or she is suffering from a medical emergency. 
Emergency departments should inform the health plan within 30 minutes after stabilization to obtain 
authorization for any medically necessary post-stabilization services. 
7. Determinations of when coverage is excluded because care is experimental: Health plans should 
have an objective process for reviewing new drugs, devices, procedures and therapies. Plans also should 
have an external, independent review process to examine the cases of seriously ill patients who are 
denied coverage for experimental treatments. 
8. Development of drug formularies: Health plans that cover prescription drugs and use restrIctIve 
formularies should allow physicians to participate in the development of the formularies and provide for 
an exception process when non-formulary alternatives are medically necessary. 
9. Disclosure of loss ratios: Health plans should uniformly calculate and disclose how much of 
premium dollars are going for health care delivery costs rather than for plan administration, profits, or 
other uses. 
10. Prohibitions against discrimination: Health plans should not discriminate in the provision of health 
care services on the basis of age, gender, race, national origin, language, religion, socio-economic status, 
sexual orientation, disability, genetic make-up, health status or source of payment. 
11. Ombudsman programs: Consumers should have access to, and health plans should cooperate with, 
an independent external nonprofit ombudsman program that helps consumers understand plan 
marketing materials and coverage provisions, educate members about their rights within health plans, 
investigate members' complaints, help members file grievances and appeals and provide consumer 
education and information. 
12. Out-of-area coverage: Health plans should cover unforeseen emergency and urgent medical care 
for members traveling outside a plan's service area. 
13. Performance measurement and data reporting: National standards for measuring and reporting 
performance should be met in areas such as quality of care, access to care, patient satisfaction and 
financial stability. 
14. Provider communication with patients: Health plans should not limit the exchange of information 
between health care providers and patients (regarding the patient's condition and treatment options). 
Health plans should not penalize providers who in good faith advocate for their patients with claims 
appeals, or report quality concerns to government authorities or health plan managers. 
15. Provider credentialing: Health plans and provider groups should develop written standards similar 
to those used by the NCQA for hiring and contracting with physicians, other providers and health care 
facilities. 
16. Provider reimbursement incentives: Neither health plans nor provider groups should use payment 
methodologies that directly encourage providers to over-treat patients or to limit medically necessary 
care. Full-risk capitation should not be used for an individual provider. Where capitation is used for an 
individual provider, it should only apply to services directly provided by that provider. 
17. Quality assurance: All health plans should be subject to comparable comprehensive quality 
assurance requirements. National standards for quality assurance should be non-duplicative and should 
provide latitude in the specific methods and incentives employed to meet the standards to reflect 
differences in health plan organization. 
18. Utilization management: Utilization management activities of health plans should be subject to 
appropriate regulation, including requirements to use appropriately licensed providers to evaluate the 
clinical appropriateness of adverse decisions. Health plans should make timely and, if necessary, 
expedited decisions, and give the principle reasons for adverse determinations and instructions for 
inititiating an appeal. Health plans should be prohibited from having compensation arrangements for 
utilization management services that contain incentives to make adverse review decisions. 
Source: The Managed Care Yearbook Fourth Edition. Melanie Matthews. 1998. 
